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The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or thI ngs to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-69 (1953 as amended) provides in 
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(l)(a) A person may not turn a vehicle or move 
right or left upon a roadway or change lanes until 
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bicycles or other human powered vehicles. If a 
highway includes two or more separate roadways, 
roadway refers to any roadway separately but not 
- • •. ' roadways collectively. 
No person shall turn a vehicle at an intersection 
unless the vehicle is in a proper position upon 
the roadway, as required in §12.44.120, or its 
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vehicle without giving an appropriate signal in 
the manner hereinafter provided in the event any 
other traffic may be affected by si ich movement. 
vi 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 20, 1988, at approximately midnight, Salt 
Lake City Police Officer Bruce Smith was on patrol, driving 
northbound on State Street in a marked police vehicle (Transcript 
dated November 1, 1988, hereinafter "T" at 8). The officer noticed 
a vehicle parked on the right-hand side of the road with the front 
passenger window down (T. 9). The officer could not identify as to 
sex the person who was standing on the sidewalk and leaning inside 
the car through the open window (T. 9, 38, 40). 
The person leaning inside the car stood up and walked 
onto the property of the Alta Motel, which was immediately to the 
right of where the vehicle was parked (T. 9, Defendant's 
Exhibit 1), The officer considered the area to be a "drug area" and 
testified that he became "suspicious" after seeing the individual 
leaning through the car window (T. 13). 
The vehicle moved forward a few feet and turned right 
into a driveway which had been directly in front of it. That 
driveway led to the parking lot of the Alta Motel (T. 9, 10, 
Defendant's Exhibit 1). The vehicle never pulled out of the 
traveled portion of the road (T. 14). It traveled on the right-hand 
parking portion of the road and did not veer left into traffic 
before turning (T. 40). 
The officer pulled into the parking lot behind the 
vehicle and placed his police car behind the vehicle so that the 
vehicle could not move (T. 9, 14). The officer testified that "the 
reason that I stopped him was no signal" (T. 14, 53). The officer 
- 2 -
told Mr. Smith that he had stopped him based on a failure to signal 
<T 5 2 3) 
The officer furth<*~ "-esti^ie^ tha1- he di.-*? -~ -' remember • 
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v - • 4^> sr^n or turned on 
hi3 spot;] i j- *~>^ugh t;i- officer responded 
a f f i r m a t i ^ - v * * - ..-,..-„
 ir. * * - 3 ; ]|]t 11 \ _ f - r c e \ i 1 1: t 
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of * ;- car ; • valke: nacK MWi^.ls r-o * l i ^ ci ••>- - * met 
t- . 
w a s i ^'N i •« 
- " ) f f i o " j r coi] i 1 n---H r e m p ^ h ^ ^ wM * |t l e s t i ons he had 
a-^- *^ - T1 1 5 1 8 ) I: 1 it 
acknowledged - • t* it some coin 1 h.1 asKeo *•-.>* appellant whether he 
had -jf, ' \ r * : ' * * ** ^ * x ] - -1 ^ o * - ^ *• *- u o ^fP j r ^  *• 
i m r 1 *- * o 
had ';Ii^e-: * - ^feno.~u J -/ru noii<--- , <• , "he 
officer ex^ - -v * ' v ^?+&* - »**• -»i - \ - - -^n-:-" 1 cation: 
j taike(3 to him, whipped out a field interrogation 
card, I'm talking to him, I had the hand held. I 
go to Channe] 4 , whi ch i s the service channel, and 
asked them to do a local county NCIC want check 
(T. 44). 
The officer filled in a field interrogation card on 
Mr. Smith. The officer explained that "a FI card is used for any 
number of reasons. Usually it's to record a contact with any 
person, whether they be arrested, cited on suspicious activity, 
known bandits out and about, we just make a note of it, run it 
through our machine records unit, and that is distributed to all law 
enforcement agencies in the valley as well as individually to each 
of our detectives" (T. 46). The officer explained that he 
field-carded Mr. Smith because "he's a convicted person, because I 
had stopped him at the Alta Motel, and because I wanted other 
agencies to be aware that Mr. Smith had been stopped, and 
subsequently arrested in case they would have had any dealings with 
him, or were looking at him in any other capacity of their job" 
(T. 53-4). The office later acknowledged that he field-carded 
Mr. Smith based on both suspicious activity and the fact that he was 
a "known" person (T. 55; see also T. 58-9). 
The officer ran a warrant check on Mr. Smith and, at some 
point prior to obtaining information through that check, asked 
Mr. Smith "what he had been arrested for" and learned that Mr. Smith 
had been convicted of a narcotics violation (T. 18). It is unclear 
from the transcript whether this occurred before or after Officer 
Smith filled out the field interrogation card. Officer Smith also 
discovered that a warrant based on a parole violation existed for 
Mr. Smith (T. 18-19). 
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during that time (T. 22-3). 
Officer Smith did not remember either himself or the 
backup officer asking whether Mr. Smith had items of value in the 
car (T. 23). The backup officer found two Ziploc baggies with a 
white powdery substance inside and some bindles which she showed to 
Officer Smith (T. 24, 63, 69). She did not approach the Appellant 
or show him what she had found (T. 63). 
The backup officer acknowledged that when she inventoried 
a vehicle, she was required to include a copy of the citation in the 
paperwork (T. 64-5). In this case, she did not see a citation for 
improper turning or improper registration (T. 65). 
The officers gave Mr. Smith no opportunity to protest the 
disposition of his belongings, and Mr. Smith did not make any such 
protestation (T. 57, 58). 
Neither Officer Smith nor the backup officer gave 
Mr. Smith his Miranda warnings (T. 24-5, 29, 64). Officer Smith did 
advise Mr. Smith that he was under arrest for possession of 
controlled substances as well as a parole or probation violation 
(T. 25). While enroute to jail, Officer Smith talked with the 
Appellant regarding his narcotics source and "asked him if he would 
cooperate with Metro if they wanted to use him" (T. 26). 
The trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress 
statements made in violation of the fifth amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution (T. 90-1, R. 27). The trial court denied defendant's 
motion to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle (T. 85-89, 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DETENTION OF MR, SMITH AND THE 
SUBSEQUENT SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE VIOLATED THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, 
The trial judge based his denial of Mr. Smith's motion to 
suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle on two grounds: (a) 
that a "stop" or "seizure" had not occurred (T. 85-89) and (b) that 
even if a seizure did occur, the officer would have been unable to 
lawfully detain Mr. Smith for a traffic violation (T. 88-90). 
Contrary to the trial judge's ruling, a seizure did occur in the 
instant case and the officer lacked adequate grounds for stopping 
the vehicle. 
A. WHEN OFFICER SMITH STOPPED MR. SMITH'S 
VEHICLE, A SEIZURE OCCURRED. 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
While this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have 
recognized that not all encounters between police and citizens 
amount to "seizures" (see State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987) 
(per curiam); State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987)), 
where a "seizure" does occur, the requirements of the fourth 
- 8 -
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(1) An
 0ffi Cer may approach a citizen at any time 
and pose questions so long as the citizen is not 
detained against his will; (2) an officer may 
seize a person if the officer has an "articulable 
suspicion" that the person has committed or is 
about to commit a crime; however, the "detention 
must be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop"; 
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer 
has probable cause to believe an offense has been 
committed or is being committed. (Citation 
omitted , x 
Deitman , " '" * . 
i:l-1 viJ '- footnote 3 ;f Trujillo, "[a] 
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r e a s o r M o l ^ ~ r s o n , i i i «<"I ew i :»f a 11 the circumstances surrounding the 
incident, believes he is no t f r e e t o ] e a / e . Me n de i 11 i a 1 1 , 4 16 U 
:!
'
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the street and questions him, if the person is willing to listen." 
(Citations omitted.) 739 P.2d at 87-88. While a brief encounter 
with a citizen on the street may not amount to a "seizure" under 
some circumstances, the stopping of a vehicle and the detention of 
its occupants constitutes a "seizure" within the meaning of the 
fourth and fourteenth amendments. See State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 
123 (Utah 1983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
In Deitman, an officer followed a white truck from the 
scene of a burglary. The truck stopped in front of a house a few 
blocks away, and the officer parked across the street and waited for 
the occupants to get out of the vehicle. The officer yelled to the 
pair and asked if he could speak to them." The pair crossed the 
street and, when asked for identification, provided some. The 
officer ran a warrants check and found an outstanding warrant 
against one of the co-defendants. However, he arrested neither 
person at that time. 
In a per curiam opinion, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
this initial encounter was not a seizure within the meaning of the 
fourth amendment. The Court pointed out: 
The officer was justified in asking defendants for 
identification and an explanation of their 
presence in an area where police had responded to 
a burglar alarm. Defendants were not detained 
against their will and were not arrested at this 
time. 
Deitman, 739 P.2d at 618. 
Unlike the situation in Deitman, the officer in the 
present case parked his vehicle directly behind that of the 
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defendant, prohibiting the defendant from driving away. Also in 
contrast to Deitman, although the record is not clear, the officer 
apparently used either his overheads or spotlight to signal the 
defendant to stop (T. 15, 41-2).1 Unlike the officer in Deitman, 
the officer in the instant case approached the defendant's car, 
making it clear that he planned to talk with the defendant (T. 17). 
In addition, when the officer ran a warrants check on Mr. Smith, the 
defendant apparently was seated in the police car, unlike the 
defendants in Deitman who were standing on the sidewalk. Finally, 
unlike the defendants in Deitman, the defendant in the present case 
was not free to leave after the encounter concluded. in contrast, 
Mr. Smith was placed in the squad car shortly after the "stop" of 
his vehicle and subsequently transported to the jail. 
The nature of the detention in State v. Swanigan, 699 
P.2d 719 (Utah 1985) (per curiam), is comparable to the detention in 
the present case. in Swanigan, the officer ordered the defendant 
1 In the affidavit of defense counsel filed in support of 
the motion for rehearing on the motion to suppress, defense counsel 
stated in part that the defendant had told her 
(a) Officer B. L. Smith stopped behind him 
with flashing overhead lights while he was parked 
on the untraveled portion of the street. 
(b) When the officer pulled behind him 
with his overhead lights, defendant then pulled 
into the Alta Motel parking lot. 
(c) The officer immediately requested the 
defendant to show his arms and the officer then 
inspected them for track marks. 
The defendant's testimony clarifies the gaps in Officer Smith's 
testimony and comports with the reasonable inference drawn from the 
officer's testimony—that he used either overhead lights or a 
spotlight to effectuate the stop. See discussion, infra, at 13-14. 
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and his companion to stop and then requested identification. He ran 
a warrants check on the pair after backup officers had arrived and 
arrested the defendant based on an outstanding warrant. The 
Swanigan court found that a seizure had occurred under the 
circumstances and that such seizure was unreasonable. 
The only difference between the seizure in the instant 
case and the seizure in Swanigan is that the pair in Swanigan was 
walking and the officer ordered them to stop, whereas in the instant 
case, the defendant was driving and the officer apparently signaled 
him in some way to stop, then blocked his ability to drive away. In 
both cases, the officer made it clear that the defendant was to 
stop, and a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have 
believed he was not free to leave. 
In State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 675 (Utah 1986), an officer 
followed a vehicle for a while, then turned on the red flashing 
lights on his patrol car. The vehicle being followed turned into a 
driveway of a house where one of the occupants of the car resided. 
In Carpena, the court did not discuss whether a seizure occurred; 
instead, it simply assumed that a seizure occurred and held that 
such seizure was unreasonable. 
The present case is distinguishable from Carpena only by 
the fact that the officer could not remember whether he used his 
overhead lights or spotlight to stop the defendant. However, the 
reasonable inference to be drawn from Officer Smith's testimony as a 
whole is that he used either his overheads or his spotlight to 
effectuate the stop. (See discussion, infra, at 13-14.) 
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Furthermore/ the appellant should not be penalized for 
the officer's failure to remember the details of a stop. The burden 
is on the State in this case to establish that the warrantless 
search was lawful. See State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408 (Utah 
1984); State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1986). The State, 
therefore, is required to establish that no seizure occurred or 
that, if one did, it was valid and that the subsequent inventory 
search of the vehicle was lawful. The testimony of the officer 
regarding his use of either the overheads or spotlight to effectuate 
the stop raises an inference that the officer used something to 
effectuate the stop and establishes that the State has failed to 
prove that the officer did not seize Mr. Smith. 
The facts of the instant case establish that a "seizure" 
occurred in this case; this was not a "level one" encounter as 
described in Merritt. The officer repeatedly referred to his 
actions as "stopping" the vehicle (T. 14, 15, 41-2, 53-4). He 
stated that"[t]hat was the reason that I stopped him was no signal" 
(T. 14) (emphasis added). He also stated: 
During that time, I do not remember the 
overheads. I usually do turn them off after a 
stop is affected, so I donft remember whether I 
used my overheads to stop him or not. 
(T. 14-15) (emphasis added). 
When asked on cross-examination by the prosecutor through 
the use of a leading question, "You didn't have on your lights or 
anything at that point?," the officer responded, "I don't remember 
whether I turned on my overheads or used my spotlight" (T. 41-2). As 
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previously stated, this implies that the officer used either his 
overheads or his spotlight to effectuate the stop and simply could 
not remember which he had chosen. 
Furthermore, the officer repeatedly acknowledged that he 
stopped Mr. Smith based on a failure to signal and that he told 
Mr. Smith that that was the reason he had stopped him (T. 14, 52-3). 
Although Officer Smith could not remember whether he used his 
overheads or spotlight to effectuate the stop, the totality of his 
testimony indicates that he required Mr. Smith to stop his vehicle 
and that, after the vehicle was stopped, Mr. Smith was not free to 
leave. 
The prosecutorfs attempts to characterize this as a level 
one encounter and not a seizure fly directly in the face of the 
officer's characterization of the stop. The officer's affirmative 
response to the prosecutor's leading question could simply have meant 
that the officer did not use a gun or physical force to require the 
stop and not that he did not stop or seize the defendant. Such 
response, when considered in the context of the totality of the 
officer's testimony, is not sufficient to support a conclusion that 
no seizure occurred. 
In addition, the actions of the officer in calling a 
backup officer immediately after arriving indicate an intention to 
detain Mr. Smith. Although the officer attempted to explain the call 
for backup based on a safety rationale, the totality of his testimony 
does not suggest safety concerns, and the officer who arrived shortly 
after the call was immediately put to work inventorying the vehicle 
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(T. 62-65). Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, a reasonable 
person in Mr. Smith's position would believe he was not free to leave 
as the result of Officer Smith's call for backup. 
Given the totality of the circumstances in this case, a 
reasonable person in the defendant's position would believe that he 
was not free to leave, and, therefore, a seizure occurred. The trial 
court erred in ruling that no seizure occurred in this case 
(T. 85-89). Of particular note is the following clarification which 
the trial judge made of his ruling: 
Q (by Ms. Palacios): What about the officer 
saying that he had stopped to give him a ticket. 
Isn't that evidence of a stop? 
THE COURT: No. That means the police officer was 
going to pull him over to give him a ticket, but 
never did. You can't have a stop by a police 
officer unless the person pulls over because of 
the police officers. I think that's pretty clear. 
(T. 92). For entire transcript of trial court's ruling and 
clarification, see Addendum A, pp. 91-92. This colloquy indicates 
the erroneous nature of the trial court's determination that no 
seizure occurred. The trial court simply disregarded the evidence 
in this case. 
The State has failed to establish that no seizure 
occurred in this case, and the trial court erred in ruling otherwise. 
B. OFFICER SMITH'S DETENTION OF THE DEFENDANT WAS 
A PRETEXT STOP AND WAS NOT BASED ON A REASONABLE 
ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT CRIMINAL ACTIVITY WAS 
AFOOT. 
The trial judge concluded that even if a seizure occurred 
in the present case, Officer Smith had a reasonable articulable 
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suspicion to justify such detention (T. 88). The Court stated: 
And had he not voluntarily stopped, he could have 
pulled him over for that traffic violation. I 
don't see anything wrong with that. 
Such a ruling was contrary to applicable case law and in violation 
of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. 
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States 
Supreme Court carved a limited exception to the general probable 
cause requirement contained in the fourth amendment. The Court held 
that under appropriate circumstances, a brief detention of a person, 
absent probable cause to arrest, is permissible. See also 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). This limited exception is 
tailored to balance the government's interest in effective law 
enforcement against the individual's liberty, privacy and personal 
security interests. In balancing these competing considerations, 
the Supreme Court has stressed that a central concern has been "to 
assure that an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not 
subject to arbitrary invasion solely at the unfettered discretion of 
officers in the field." Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). 
In justifying a particular detention, an officer must be 
able to point to specific articulable facts which, when viewed under 
an objective standard, create a reasonable suspicion that the 
defendant has committed or is about to commit a crime. Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). 
This Court has reiterated the Terry Court's insistence on such a 
standard, cautioning that n[a]nything less would invite intrusions 
upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more 
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substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this court has 
consistently refused to sanction. And simple 'good faith on the 
part of the arresting officer1 is not enough . . . .n Trujillo, 739 
P.2d at 88 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22). This 
constitutionally mandated "reasonable suspicion" necessary to 
justify detention has been codified in Utah law. See Utah Code Ann. 
§77-7-15 (1953 as amended); Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 88. 
In State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah App. 1988), 
this Court outlined two "alternative" grounds for constitutionally 
justifying the stop of a motor vehicle. 
First, it could be based on specific, articulable 
facts which, together with rational inferences 
drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable 
person to conclude Sierra had committed or was 
about to commit a crime. [Citations omitted.] 
Second, the stop could be incident to a lawful 
citation for the traffic violation of driving 
unlawfully in the left lane. 
Id. This Court first considered whether, given the totality of the 
circumstances confronting the officer at the time of the seizure, 
the officer had a constitutionally mandated reasonable suspicion and 
determined that he did not. 
The court next considered in Sierra the State's argument 
that "the initial stop of the defendant was permissible because it 
was incident to a lawful stop for a traffic violation." I_d. at 
977. This Court disagreed, pointing out that officers cannot 
randomly stop cars on public roads and that "it is impermissible for 
law enforcement officers to use a misdemeanor arrest as a pretext to 
search for evidence of a more serious crime. See United States v. 
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Millio, 588 P. Supp. 45, 49 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (Citations omitted)." 
Id. This Court also pointed out that in Taglavore v. United states, 
291 F.2d 262, 265 (9th Cir. 1961), the Court stated: 
The violation of a constitutional right by a 
subterfuge cannot be justified . . . were the use 
of misdemeanor arrest warrants as a pretext for 
searching people suspected of felonies to be 
permitted, a mockery could be made of the fourth 
amendment and its guarantees. The courts must be 
vigilant to detect and prevent such a misuse of 
legal processes. 
Id. 
To determine whether a stop for a traffic violation is a 
pretext, the Court must consider the totality of the circumstances. 
"Whether a fourth amendment violation has occurred 'turns on an 
objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts 
and circumstances confronting him at the time,' and not on the 
officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was 
taken (citations omitted)." Id. 
The Sierra Court concluded that a reasonable officer, 
under the circumstances of that case, would not have stopped the 
driver for remaining too long in the left lane and that, since the 
surrounding circumstances indicated that the stop was a pretext, the 
seizure was unconstitutional. 
in State v. Arroyo, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (1989), this 
Court again considered whether the initial stop of the defendant was 
a pretext. In Arroyo, the defendant was stopped for "following too 
closely." In that case, this Court again determined that a 
reasonable officer would not have stopped the defendant except for 
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"some unarticulated suspicion of more serious criminal activity." 
.Id. at 35. 
In the instant case, a reasonable officer, given the 
totality of the circumstances, would not have stopped Mr. Smith for 
an improper right turn. As this Court pointed out in Sierra, "[t]he 
proper inquiry does not focus on whether the officer could validly 
have made the stop" but on whether a reasonable officer would have 
made the stop. _Id. a t 978. 
The officer in this case repeatedly asserted that the 
reason he stopped the defendant was that the defendant made an 
improper right turn without signaling (T. 14, 15, 41-2, 52-3). 
However, the backup officer never saw a copy of the citation, even 
though she was required to include a copy in her inventory paperwork 
(T. 65). A review of the applicable statutes and ordinance raises a 
question as to whether an improper turn was made in this case. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-69 (1953 as amended) provides in 
pertinent part: 
(l)(a) A person may not turn a vehicle or move 
right or left upon a roadway or change lanes until 
the movement can be made with reasonable safety 
and an appropriate signal has been given. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-1 (1953 as amended) defines roadway as follows: 
(37) "Roadway" means that portion of highway 
improved, designed, or ordinarily used for 
vehicular travel, exclusive of a sidewalk, berm, 
or shoulder, even though any of them are used by 
persons riding bicycles or other human-powered 
vehicles. If a highway includes two or more 
separate roadways, roadway refers to any roadway 
separately but not to all roadways collectively. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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The Salt Lake City Code §12.44.130 contains a similar 
provision. It states: 
No person shall turn a vehicle at an intersection 
unless the vehicle is in a proper position upon 
the roadway, as required in §12.44.120, or its 
successor, or turn a vehicle to enter a private 
road or driveway, or otherwise turn a vehicle from 
a direct course, or move right or left upon a 
roadway unless and until such movement can be made 
with reasonable safety. No person shall turn any 
vehicle without giving an appropriate signal in 
the manner hereinafter provided in the event any 
other traffic may be affected by such movement. 
(Emphasis added.) Whether turning right from the parking lane into 
a driveway immediately in front of the vehicle violates the improper 
turning statute is questionable. Because the statute explicitly 
requires that the turn be made from the roadway, the question 
becomes whether the parking lane off the traveled portion is 
considered part of the roadway so as to require a signal. The 
definition of roadway specifically excludes the berm or shoulder; 
arguably, the parking lane which is not traveled fits within that 
exclusion. 
The Salt Lake City ordinance requires a signal "in the 
event any other traffic may be affected by such movement." It is 
unclear from the phrase what being "affected by such movement" 
means. This phrase gives police officers the same unacceptable 
breadth of discretion in deciding to stop a vehicle as did the 
statutes in Sierra. 
Furthermore, the evidence does not establish that other 
traffic was "affected" by the movement, regardless of the meaning of 
the term affected. Defendant's vehicle was in the untraveled 
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portion of the roadway and never entered the roadway. Hence, even 
if other cars were in the roadway, they would not have been 
"affected" by the movement and therefore no violation occurred. In 
addition, the officer did not testify that other cars were in the 
roadway at the time; the evidence sustains a finding only that the 
officer's car was in the roadway, not that any other cars were 
present or that the movement of defendant's vehicle "affected" the 
officer's car in any way. 
Furthermore, the manner in which the inventory search was 
conducted suggests that the stop was a pretext and that in stopping 
Mr. Smith, Officer Smith was looking for an opportunity to search 
his vehicle. After Officer Smith determined that he was going to 
arrest Mr. Smith on a probation violation, the officer ascertained 
that the vehicle was not properly registered.3 officer Smith had 
already called a backup officer, and, when she arrived, Officer 
Smith had decided to impound the vehicle because it was not properly 
registered. The backup officer, Officer Morgan, did an inventory 
search as part of the impound procedure. 
in State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court pointed out that "even if it could be determined that 
the impoundment itself was reasonably necessary, the search of the 
vehicle trunk was nevertheless not a valid inventory search." The 
Court pointed out that where an officer does not follow a 
3 The officer's information regarding the registration 
problem flowed from the initial illegal stop and was not known to 
him at the time the stop was made. 
- 21 -
regularized set of procedures in inventorying a vehicle, the 
inventory search may well be a pretext for a warrantless search. In 
Hygh, the officer did not give the defendant an opportunity to 
arrange for the disposition of his property or otherwise involve the 
defendant and did not completely search the vehicle or make a list 
of the items seized. The Court held that the inventory was a 
pretext for a warrantless search and therefore unlawful and 
suppressed the evidence. 
In the present case, although Officer Morgan testified 
that she followed a checklist, she did not ask Mr. Smith if anything 
of value was in the vehicle or otherwise involve him in the 
inventorying (T. 63). Officer Smith told her the nature of 
Mr. Smith's probation violation which alerted her to look for 
drug-related items. While the failure to involve Mr. Smith in the 
inventory was not as egregious as the officer's actions in Hygh, it 
nevertheless further suggests that Officer Smith's detention of 
Mr. Smith for an improper turn was a pretext. 
Even if a technical violation did occur in this case, a 
reasonable police officer would not have cited the driver except for 
"some unarticulated suspicion of more serious criminal activity." 
See Arroyo, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35. As was the case in Sierra, 
the officer in the present case was "suspicious" or had an inkling 
regarding Mr. Smith before he saw Mr. Smith commit any purported 
traffic violation (T. 11-12; see Sierra, 754 P.2d at 980). Right 
turns without signals from the shoulder or even the roadway occur 
frequently and often go unnoticed. Here, where the car moved only a 
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few feet to a driveway directly in front of it, a reasonable officer 
would not have cited the driver but for some unarticulated and 
unacceptable hunch. 
In addition, the officer in this case did not have a 
reasonable articulable suspicion so as to justify the stop. While 
the officer repeatedly stated that he stopped Mr. Smith for an 
improper turn, he also pointed out that he was "suspicious" when he 
first saw a person leaning into the car window and that the area was 
a high crime area where both prostitution and drug use were 
prevalent. These circumstances fail to justify the stop. 
In State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987), this 
Court determined that an officer's decision to stop defendant was 
based initially on two factors, one of which was the high amount of 
crime in the area. This Court held that the seizure of the 
defendant was unconstitutional—the detention of the defendant being 
unreasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment. In 
State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986), the officer cited the 
"high crime area" factor as one of the bases for his suspicion of 
criminal behavior on the part of the defendants. The Utah Supreme 
Court's per curiam decision did not address the issue specifically, 
but since the Court held that the information known to the officer 
did not justify the stop, it can be inferred that the high crime 
area factor was insufficient to justify the challenged stop. 
In People v. Bower, 24 Cal. 3rd 638, 645, 597 P.2d 115, 
119 (Cal. 1979), the California Supreme Court recognized that many 
citizens shop, work, play, transact business, visit, or live in 
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areas that have high crime rates. The Court noted that "[t]he 
spectrum of legitimate human behavior occurs every day in so-called 
crime areas. As a result, this Court has appraised this factor with 
caution and has been relunctant to conclude that a location's crime 
rate transforms otherwise innocent-appearing circumstances into 
circumstances justifying the seizure of an individual. Id. 
(citations omitted) . 
In State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), this 
Court analogized Mr. Seryfs arrival from Florida as a basis for a 
reasonable suspicion to the testimony in State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 
181 (Utah 1987)f that Interstate 15 was often used by illegal aliens 
from Mexico. Id. at 18. This Court pointed out that the fact that 
a person got off a flight which originated in Florida did not amount 
to an objective fact upon which a reasonable suspicion could be 
based just as the fact that a person was traveling on 1-15 did not 
support a reasonable suspicion in Mendoza. This Court noted: 
In Mendoza, the Court considered it unlikely that 
illegal alien transporters comprised a significant 
portion of 1-15 traffic. It seems equally 
unlikely that drug couriers comprise a significant 
portion of the travelers through Salt Lake 
International Airport, even of those whose flight 
originated in Florida. 
Id. at 18. Applying the analyses of Mendoza and Sery to the instant 
case, it seems just as unlikely that persons who are involved with 
drugs or prostitution comprise a significant portion of the people 
on State Street, and information that a person was leaning through a 
window talking to a driver of a car which was parked at the side of 
the road is not a fact upon which a constitutionally sound 
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reasonable suspicion could be based. 
Furthermore, leaning against an open window of a car to 
talk with a driver is not an unusual circumstance and is just as 
consistent with innocent behavior as any other type of behavior. 
The officer did not know whether the person was male or female and, 
according to his testimony, saw no more than the figure of a person 
leaning against a car. While an "officer is entitled to assess the 
facts in light of his experience" (Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 88-89), it 
is also "imperative that the facts be judged against an objective 
standard []" which would "warrant a [person] of reasonable caution 
in the belief that the action taken was appropriate[.]" Trujillo, 
739 P.2d at 88. 
Officer Smith offered no interpretation as to why a 
person leaning against the car made him suspicious. It could have 
simply been the fact that two individuals were talking in what the 
officer perceived to be a high crime area. This is very similar to 
the facts in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and does not pass 
constitutional muster. 
Hence, the State did not sustain its burden of 
establishing that the seizure in the instant case was lawful, and 
the subsequent inventory search of Mr. Smithfs car therefore 
violated his fourth amendment rights. All of the fruits which 
flowed from the initial illegal detention, including all of the 
items seized during the search of his car, should be suppressed. 
Mr. Smith respectfully requests that those items be suppressed and 
that this Court reverse his conviction and remand his case to the 
- 25 -
trial court with an order for either dismissal or suppression of the 
illegally seized evidence. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR REHEARING ON MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS. 
In articulating his decision, the trial judge mentioned 
at least three times that the defendant had not testified and that 
relying on the testimony of the officer, it appeared that there had 
been no seizure (T. 85, 92). Following the denial of the motion to 
suppress, defendant filed a motion for rehearing on the motion to 
suppress. Attached to that motion was an affidavit of defense 
counsel which proffered the testimony of Mr. Smith. See 
Addendum B. Defense counsel was essentially asking the court to 
rehear the matter and allow her to present the defendant's testimony 
(R. 31-33). 
According to the affidavit, if the defendant were to 
testify, he would testify that (a) Officer B. L. Smith stopped him 
with flashing overhead lights while he was parked on the untraveled 
portion of the street; (b) when the officer pulled behind him with 
his overhead lights, defendant then pulled into the Alta Motel 
parking lot; (c) the officer immediately requested the defendant to 
show his arms and the officer then inspected them for track marks 
(R. 31). The trial judge refused to rehear the matter despite the 
fact that the case was set for trial before him shortly after the 
time that the motion for rehearing was heard (R. 34, Transcript of 
Hearing held November 28, 1988 at 11-12). The judge's refusal to 
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rehear the motion to suppress, despite the procedural posture of the 
case and the fact that if the defendant's proffered testimony were 
believed, the earlier ruling on the motion to suppress was 
erroneous, violated the interests of justice and fairness and was 
erroneous. 
In Utah, in order to preserve an issue raised in a motion 
to suppress, the defendant must make a specific objection to the use 
of the evidence at trial. See State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 
1983). The purpose of requiring an objection at trial is to enable 
the trial judge to reconsider his decision and have "an opportunity 
to avoid error in the trial which may have been created by an 
improper ruling on a pretrial motion . . . ." J^ d. at 82. 
In her concurring opinion in State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 
1069 (Utah 1987),2 Justice Durham emphasized "the obligation of 
defense counsel to notify judges who have ruled on pretrial 
suppression issues that defendant's objections to challenged 
evidence are reserved and not withdrawn, thus alerting those judges 
to the possibility that trial evidence may affect the validity of 
earlier rulings." IQ. at 1076. She pointed out that trial judges 
must be given the opportunity to reassess the evidence and their 
pretrial rulings "if there is any likelihood they were erroneous." 
In the present case, the testimony of Officer Smith did 
2
 Justices Howe and Zimmerman concurred in the concurring 
opinion of Justice Durham. 
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not give a clear picture of the events surrounding the initial stop 
of the appellant or of the actions of the officer immediately after 
he approached the appellant. Despite the ambiguity of the officerfs 
testimony and the State's burden to establish that the seach of the 
vehicle was lawful, the trial court determined that the officer did 
not "seize" the defendant and that, even if he did, such seizure was 
reasonable. Regardless of the ultimate holding of this Court on the 
issues raised in Point I of this brief, it is apparent that it is a 
close question as to whether the search in this case violated the 
fourth amendment. Under such circumstances, a rehearing on the 
motion to suppress was appropriate. 
Had this matter been tried, defendant could have 
testified to the proffered evidence. Such evidence, if believed by 
the trial court, would have changed the trial court's ruling as to 
whether the officer stopped the defendant since, according to the 
defendant's testimony, the officer, with his overhead lights 
flashing, pulled in behind the defendant while he was still parked 
on the street (R. 32). Furthermore, such evidence should have 
altered the court's ruling as to whether the traffic stop was a 
pretext since, according to the defendant's proffer, the officer 
immediately checked his arms for needle track marks after stopping 
him. 
This matter was set for trial before the court a week 
after the motion for rehearing was heard (R. 34) but was ultimately 
resolved at the same time that the motion for rehearing was heard 
(R. 39). Given the factual closeness of this case, the trial 
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court's emphasis on the fact that the defendant did not testify at 
the suppression hearing (T. 85, 92), the significant gaps in Officer 
Smith's testimony and questions left as to what actually occurred, 
the trial court should have granted defendant's motion in the 
interests of justice to insure that its prior ruling was fair and 
just. 
The procedural posture of this case at the time of the 
motion for rehearing buttresses Mr. Smith's position. The judge 
knew he was about to try the case, and it would have taken only a 
few minutes to hear Mr. Smith's testimony. 
Defense counsel made every attempt to insure that the 
concerns in Johnson and Lesley were met. The trial judge, on the 
other hand, simply did not care to reassess the evidence despite the 
fact that an injustice may well have been done. By presenting her 
proffer, asking for rehearing, and preserving her right to appeal, 
defense counsel did all that was possible in the context of this 
case to preserve this issue for review by this Court. 
Mr. Smith is not arguing that in all cases a trial judge 
must be required to grant rehearing on a motion to suppress. 
However, in rare cases such as this where it appears that the 
interests of justice will be best served by granting such a motion, 
such a rehearing should be allowed to preserve the integrity of the 
system and the fairness of the result. 
The trial judge erred in denying the motion for 
rehearing, and, in the event this Court does not reverse and remand 
this case pursuant to the issues raised in Point I of this brief, 
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the matter should nevertheless be reversed for rehearing and 
redetermination of the motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Smith 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse his conviction and 
remand the case to the trial court with an order of dismissal or 
suppression of the illegally seized evidence, or, in the 
alternative, remand the case for rehearing on the motion to suppress. 
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ADDENDUM A 
1 like to review them with respect to that. 
2 THE COURT: Thank you. 
3 THE COURT: I'm generally familiar with these 
4 cases that you note Ms. Palacios. Submit the matter? 
5 MR. LEMCKE: State submits, Your Honor. 
6 MS. PALACIOS: We'd submit it, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Really, I think this case boils 
8 down to the simple question of whether or not there was a 
9 stop in the classic sense. A stop as I read the cases 
10 both State and federal are when a police officer for 
11 whatever reason because of the fact that the individual 
12 is a police officer, and he has — he may or may not have 
13 a marked car, usually a marked car with blinking lights 
14 and all those things that signal to a driver that a 
15 police officer wants him to pull over. I suppose in 
16 extreme circumstances there may be some action taken with 
17 the vehicle to pull over an individual, particularly if 
18 they are inclined not to pull over. 
19 But the point is, there's got to be some type of a 
20 stop that would not have been made but for the police 
21 officer's presence, and request that the individual stop. 
22 And as I hear the testimony in this case, and I 
23 haven't heard a thing from the defendant, so I don't know 
24 what his version is, and I must assume it's the same, but 
25 in any event, the long and the short of it is, I have a 
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police officer that tells me that he's driving in an 
area, and it may be high crime, and I haven't read a case 
that says you ignore traffic violations just because it's 
high crime. I've read cases that said you can't use a 
traffic stop as a ruse, or you can't use a high crime 
area as a basis for pulling somebody over. There's got 
to be a reason. But certainly if there's a violation of 
the law, whether it's a high crime area or not, it seems 
to me that Officer Smith was obligated to follow up on 
that violation, minor as it may be, turning without 
appropriate signals. 
As I read the city ordinance here with regard to 
turn signals, and taking into account the location, not 
the location because it's a high crime area, but the 
location it's on State Street, and I believe it occurred 
about midnight, I don't have the day of the week, but we 
know there was at least one car immediately behind, or 
close behind Mr. Smith's automobile when he pulled 
forward, and turned into the driveway. I think the law 
is, from a traffic standpoint, based on what I read here, 
that he had an obligation to signal. Whether he happened 
to^  be parked on the side of the road or not is 
irrelevant, or whether he was in one of the travel lanes. 
But in any event, it appears to me, and I don't know 
what happened to the traffic citation, whether it was 
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contested, and whether there was a resolution with regard 
to that, and whether that was a violation of the law, or 
whether Mr. Smith ignored it. But in any event, it 
certainly indicates to me that there's an obligation, 
assuming there's nothing more pressing elsewhere, a drug 
deal, for Officer Smith to look into that failure to 
signal. 
But the evidence I have, even more importantly, is 
that Mr. Smith parked his vehicle, stopped his vehicle, 
pulled into a parking place before the officer pulled him 
over. The evidence, as I hear it, just merely indicates 
to me that Officer Smith pulled in. Whether or not Mr. 
Smith knew he was there, I don't have the faintest idea 
because I don't have any testimony in that regard. I do 
know that he pulled into the parking area of the Alta 
Motel, pulled into a parking space, and apparently did 
that all before Officer Smith had arrived on the scene. 
There's not even any indication one way or the other, and 
one way or the other doesn't give any evidence at all as 
to whether or not he even had any overhead lights on, or 
made any indications with his spotlights that he wanted 
Mr. Smith to stop. 
The evidence, as I hear it, is that Mr. Smith made 
a voluntary stop. At that point in time pulled into the 
parking area in Alta Motel, and stopped. And then got 
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1 out of his car when he saw the police officer. Maybe it 
2 all happened about the same time. I don't believe it was 
3 a stop in the true sense. And so I don't find anything 
4 wrong with the stop, because there wasn't a stop. 
5 But even if there was, I'm satisfied that there's 
6 sufficient reason for Officer Smith to follow the vehicle 
7 in there. And had he not voluntarily stopped, he could 
8 have pulled him over for that traffic violation. I don't 
9 see anything wrong with that. 
10 As far as the things that occurred there 
11 afterwards, it certainly appears to me that there was 
12 nothing that Officer Smith did with regard to inquiry of 
13 the defendant in this case, Mr. Smith, as to who he was, 
14 and what he was doing. It's all routine. He asked him 
15 who he was. He asked for identification. He asked for 
16 registration on the car, nothing unusual about that, and 
17 certainly not improper for a police officer under 
18 appropriate circumstances to ask for those things of any 
19 citizens. 
20 And then he finds out that apparently by voluntary 
21 information that Mr. Smith is on parole. He makes 
22 further inquiry based on that. Nothing wrong with any of 
23 those things that's happened. He finds out there's a 
24 warrant, takes him into custody. He finds out based upon 
25 what appears to be a voluntary statement, and a lack of 
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registration on the part of Mr. Smith, that the vehicle 
is improperly tagged by way of license plates. 1 can't 
find anything wrong with impounding the vehicle. 
The manner in which the search was conducted by 
Officer Morgan appears to be in conformance with not only 
policy, but good practice. This is not a separate 
container in a trunk that I have to worry about, this is 
something rolled up in a pair of levis laying out on the 
seat. And prudence dictates, and I'd be surprised if a 
reasonable and competent officer did not look in rolled 
up clothing to see if there might be a weapon or other 
contraband. It would be inappropriate not to do that. 
And I think the Supreme Court's ruled precisely on those 
issues with regard to the nature of the search that can 
be done in a stop that might be questioned with regard to 
looking for firearms, and other contraband if for no 
other reason protection of the public and police officer. 
So, I don't see anything wrong with the inventory 
that was all pursuant to impounding the vehicle. I am 
concerned, however, about the statements made by Mr. 
Smith enroute to the police station. It seems to me that 
while good police work would certainly suggest that one 
ought to inquiry to see if a suspect can provide 
information that might lead to ferreting out those that 
deal in drugs, it's appropriate where the State is going 
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1 to rely at least in part on the statements of the 
2 defendant in this case as to what his intentions were 
3 with the drugs that were found, it's incumbent upon the 
4 police officer to suggest to the arrested person, in this 
5 case Mr. Smith, that anything — that he has a right to 
61 remain silent. And whether or not that would have made 
7 any difference isn't the issue. 
8 The issue raised is it's pretty routine to begin 
91 with. And if police officers want to talk to people 
10 after they've arrested them, then I think they ought to 
11 comply with the law. And that is that you've got to 
12 advise a person of his Miranda rights, and failure to do 
13 that, except in some rare circumstances, prohibits the 
14 introduction of any statements that might be made, 
15 particularly under circumstances where the conversation 
16 is suggesting that there might be some advantageous 
17 position that the defendant might gain by cooperating. 
18 Kind of suggests to a defendant that now is the time to 
19 talk, because I may be able to do something for you, if 
20 you want to cooperate. 
21 If you're going to ask those things, it's got to 
22 be after Miranda so that it's clear that the defendant 
23 has no obligation to speak, at least until the 
24 defendant's attorney is there. So, I think any statement 
25 that was made by Mr. Smith enroute that might be relied 
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1 upon for the State to prove any portion of the case, and 
2 I particularly see that as a key element — at least one 
3 of the elements of the intent, I think I'm required to 
4 suppress, and the motion it granted in that regard. 
5 As far as the motion to suppress the contraband, 
6 the drugs and other items that were found in the vehicle 
7 the defendant was driving, that motion is denied. 
8 There's no basis for it. I grant it in part, and deny it 
9 in part. 
10 MS. PALACIOS: Your Honor, may I have a 
11 clarification on the court's ruling for the record? The 
12 court indicated that you found that there was no stop, 
13 because the vehicle was already stopped. 
14 THE COURT: Yes. 
15 MS. PALACIOS: I'd just like to point out to 
16 the court, and I checked the case to make sure in State 
17 versus Carpenia, the officers followed a vehicle, and 
18 then put the lights on, and the vehicle stopped into the 
19 driveway of the person who lived there. So, there is no 
20 evidence in that case whether or not they would have 
21 pulled over voluntarily or not. This court then is 
22 saying that the fact that he had already pulled into the 
23 driveway and stopped means that it's not a police stop. 
24 THE COURT: You can't have a stop unless the 
25 police tell the person to stop is what I'm saying, and I 
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1 see a distinction in that case. Just because he happened 
2 to be at his driveway, and they flip on the overheads, he 
3 would have stopped in his driveway, or stopped in the 
4 street if he hadn't been in front of his house. There's 
5 a difference. What we have here — what I see from the 
6 evidence, and maybe somebody else looks at it different, 
7j but at least everything I hear is Mr. Smith started his 
8 car up, maybe it's because he saw the police officer, 
9 maybe because he didn't. Anyway he pulled in there, and 
10 parked his vehicle in a stall in the Alta Motel provided 
11 for parking. And the only evidence I've got is he did 
12 all that voluntarily, stopped his car voluntarily. And I 
13 don't view that to be a stop even though a police officer 
14 may have been behind him. I don't know if Mr. Smith even 
15 knew he was there. 
16 MS. PALACIOS: What about the officer saying 
17 that he had stopped to give him a ticket. Isn't that 
18 evidence of a stop? 
19 THE COURT: No. That means the police officer 
20 was going to pull him over to give him a ticket, but 
21 never did. You can't have a stop by a police officer 
22 unless the person pulls over because of the police 
23 officers. I think that's pretty clear. 
24 MS. PALACIOS: I disagree, but I'll submit 
25 that, Your Honor. 
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ADDENDUM B 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
NOV -7 1988 
FRANCES M. PALACIOS (#2502) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JEROME SMITH, 
Defendant 
MOTION FOR REHEARING ON 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 881991297 
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
The defendant, JEROME SMITH, by and through his attorney of 
record, FRANCES M. PALACIOS, hereby moves the Court for a rehearing 
on defendant's motion to suppress evidence previously held and 
denied on Tuesday, November 1, 1988 based upon the grounds stated in 
the attached affidavit and in the interests of justice. 
DATED this V day, November, 1988. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
FRANCES M.'PALACIOS 
Attorney for Defendant 
floor*** Ccu*tc£-. 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to Mr. -James Cope 
of the County Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, this 7 day of Novemb.er, 1988. 
FRANCES M. PALACIOS, (#2502) 
Attorney for Defendant 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD 
STATE OF UTAH 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
NOV - 7 1988 
/ I 
i H i n c ^ Clerk 3rd Dtet. Court 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
DEFENSE COUNSEL 
VS. 
JEROME SMITH, 
Defendant, 
Civil No, 881991297 
State of Utah ) 
:SS 
County of Salt Lake ) 
and says 
FRANCES M. PALACIOS, being first duly sworn, deposes 
1) That I am attorney for the above-named defendant, 
JEROME SMITH, and I represented Mr. Smith in the 
motion to suppress held on Tuesday, November 1, 
1988. 
2) That my client informed me that: 
a) Officer B. L. Smith stopped behind him with 
flashing overhead lights while he was parked on the 
untraveled portion of the street. 
b) when the officer pulled behind him with his 
overhead lights, defendant the)? pulled into the Alta 
Motel parking lot. 
c) the officer immediately requested the defendant 
to show his arms and the officer then inspected 
them for track marks; 
all'contrary to Officer B. L. Smith's testimony at 
the suppression hearing. 
3) I advised my client, based upon my understanding of 
the law, that the testimony of the officer was 
sufficient grounds upon which tj^vjievAil in our 
motion to suppress and thereforeAneea not testify, 
4) That in the course of the court's findings, the 
court remarked approximately three times that the 
defendant had not testified, that there was no 
stop, and that was based in part upon the fact that 
there were no overhead lights. 
5) That, after hearing the court's findings , it 
became clear that my advise was erroneously given 
and the interest of justice would be served by 
allowing the defendant to testify and supplement 
the record m a rehearing on a motion to suppress, 
DATED this [ day of November, 1988. 
^FRANCES M. PALACIOS 
Attorney for Defendant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this I day of 
November, 1988. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residmgj^t Sal t Lake City 
My Commission Expires: 
